Intentionally
From CrimeLine from Andrew Keogh
See also:
Criminal Justice Act 1967
Section 8 Proof of criminal intent: A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,—
- (a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but
- (b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances
The definitions of many criminal offences include terms relating to the `intention' of the perpetrator. For example, to a large extent the distinction between murder and manslaughter corresponds to the distinction between `intending' an act and `recklessly allowing' it to happen. Intention is not usually defined; instead it is frequently for the jury to decide, as a matter of fact, whether the accused had the intention to carry out the act charged. In most cases, it is argued, juries need no help in understanding the term. But consider this case: a man sets fire to his restaurant in the busiest part of the day, in the hope of profiting from an insurance payout. Naturally, many people die. Does the perpetrator `intend' to kill them? Clearly he would have foreseen the likelihood that his actions would lead to death or injury, and accepted that this was the likely outcome. Even though he did not purposefully kill his customers, the restaurateur purposely carried out an act that led to their deaths, in full knowledge of the likelihood of this eventuality.
In general, intention is different from `motivation' or 'desire'. However earnestly I desire the deaths of TV game show hosts, I do not necessarily 'intend' to kill them. While almost everyone is agreed that if I expressly set out to kill TV game show hosts, then I have 'intention' to kill them. This is called 'direct intention'. However, 'intention' in law is not as narrow as this. At the opposite end of the 'intention scale' it is argued that I intend some consequences if it is likely that my actions will have those consequences. Over the last thirty years the meaning of intention has varied between these two extremes.
- In Hyam v DPP 1974 the House of Lords accepted that the accused 'intends' the consequences of his actions if it is 'highly probable' that those consequences will arise from the actions. However, there was no general agreement on how probable the consequences should be. Lord Hailsham used the terms 'inseparable consequences' and 'morally certain consequence', while Lord Diplock was prepared to accept 'likely'. This judgement caused some confusion because it made intention difficult to distinguish from Recklessness.
- In R v Moloney 1985 it was held that in most cases a jury would not need to be directed as to the meaning of 'intention'; a common-sense understanding was adequate. However, Lord Bridge issued guidelines to this effect: it could be assumed that if the accused realized that the results of his action were the 'natural consequences' of the action, this gave additional weight to the view that the consequences were intended. The jury would still have to consider other factors along with this one. of the actions. This definition is somewhat narrower than the 'highly probable' consequences of Hyam, but perhaps slightly broader than Lord Hailsham's 'inseparable consequences'. In any event, it was not long before the inexactness of the term 'natural consequences' gave rise to another complicated case.
- In R v Hancock and Shankland 1986 Lord Scarman approved Lord Bridges guidelines in R v Moloney, but stressed that 'natural consequences' should be interpreted to indicate that a high likelihood of the action having the specified consequences increased the likelihood that the consequence was intended, but it was still not enough on its own. Scarman also reiterated that it is largely a matter for the jury to use common sense to decide whether an act was intended.
- In R v Neddrick 1986 the Court of Appeal accepted the House of Lords ruling in R v Moloney, and allowed that foresight of the consequences of an action only allows a jury to 'infer intent' if the consequences are 'virtually certain' (Lane LCJ). In previous cases the Court of Appeal had tended to follow the ruling in Hyam.
- In R v Woollin 1997 the Court of Appeal tried to broaden the definition of intention again, but the House of Lords restated that the principle in Neddrick should apply. However, the wording of the judgement uses the term 'find intent' rather than 'infer intent' which has let some authorities to claim that the Lords are supporting the view that a 'virtually certain' consequence is the same as an intended consequence, where Neddrick only suggests that it increases the probability of intention.
At present the position on intention appears to be as follows: if the accused carries out action A, with consequence C, then
- the accused intended C if he carried out A in order expressly to bring about C;
- the accused intended C if he carried out action A, from which C was virtually certain, in which case
- the accused need not have a motive or desire to bring about C.
Mens rea
The 'mens rea' of murder is either an intention to kill (R v Woolin) or an intention to cause grievous bodily harm (R v Moloney [1984] UKHL 4 (21 March 1984); (1985) 1 AER 1025, R v Hancock & Shankland [1985] UKHL 9 (27 February 1985) (1986) 1 AC 455, and R v Woolin (1999) AC 82). See intention (criminal) for a general discussion, and Intention in English law. In 'Moloney', Lord Bridge was clear that, for the defendant to have the 'mens rea' of murder, there must be something more than mere foresight or knowledge that death or serious injury is a "natural" consequence of the current activities: there must be clear evidence of an intention. This intention is proved not only when the defendant's motive or purpose is to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, but when death or grievous bodily harm is virtually certain occur and the defendant foresees death or grievous bodily harm as the virtually certain consequence of his act. Also note that, in 'Maloney', Lord Bridge held that the 'mens rea' of murder need not be aimed at a specific person so, if a terrorist plants a bomb in a public place, it is irrelevant that no specific individual is targeted so long as one or more deaths is virtually certain. Further, it is irrelevant that the terrorist might claim justification for the act through a political agenda. How or why one person kills could only have relevance in the sentence (law)|sentencing phase of a trial.
In Woolmington v DPP (1935) AC 462, 461 the general principle was laid down that the burden is on the prosecution to prove the facts essential to their case in his speech viscount sankey L.C who famously said: “Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any 'statutory exception'.
